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PENSIONS,  THE OPTION  VALUE  OF  WORK,  AND RETIREMENT 
ABSTRACT 
The paper  develops  a  model  of retirement  based  on the option  value  of 
continuing  to work.  Continuing  to work  maintains  the option  of retiring  on 
more advantageous  terms later.  The model  is used to estimate  the effects  on 
retirement  of firm  pension  plan  provisions.  Typical  defined  benefit  pension 
plans in the United  States provide  very  substantial  incentives  to remain  with 
the firm  until some age, often  the early  retirement  age,  and then  a strong 
incentive  to leave  the firm  thereafter.  (This may  be a major reason  for the 
rapidly  declining  labor  force participation  rates  of older  workers  in  the 
United  States.)  The model  fits firm  retirement  data  very well;  it captures 
very closely  the sharp  discontinuous  jumps  in retirement  rates  at specific 
ages.  The model  is used to simulate  the effect  on retirement  of potential 
changes  in pension  plan provisions.  Increasing  the age of early  retirement 
from 55 to 60, for example,  would  reduce  firm  departure  rates  between  ages 50 
and 59 by almost  forty  percent. 
David  A. Wise  James H. Stock 
Kennedy  School of Government  Kennedy  School  of Government 
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Harvard  University 
79 Kennedy  Street  79 Kennedy Street 
Cambridge, MA  02138  Cambridge,  MA  02138 The typical  firm penaion plan  presenta  very large  incentives  to retire 
from  the firm at an early  age, often  aa young  aa 55.  Although the labor 
supply  effects of Social  Security provisions  have been the subject  of a great 
deal of  analysis,  much less attention  has been directed  to the implications  of 
firm  pension  plans.  Yet the retirement  inducements  in the provisions  of firm 
plans  are much greater  than  the incentives  inherent  in Social Security  benefit 
formulae,  as demonstrated  by  liotlikoff and  Wise [1985, 1987] 
.  Indeed,  the 
provisions  of most  firm  plans are at odds with the planned  increase  in the 
Social  Security  retirement  age.  This paper  presents  a  new model  of 
retirement  and uses it to estimate  the effects  of pension  plan  provisiona  on 
the departure  rates of older  salesmen  from  a large  Fortune  500 firm.  An 
important  goal  is to  develop  a  model that can  be used to predict  the effects 
on retirement  of potential  changes  in pension  plan provisions.  The analysis 
is based on longitudinal  personnel  records  from the firm. 
The option  value of  continued  work is  the central  feature  of the model. 
Pension plan provisions  typically  provide  a large bonus if the employee works 
until  a certain  age,  often  the early  retirement  age,  and then  a substantial 
inducement  to leave  thereafter.  Employees  who retire  later may do so under 
less advantageous  conditions.  If  the employee  retires  before  the early 
retirement  age,  the option  of a later bonus  is lost.  Continuing  to work 
preserves  the option  of retiring  later,  hence  the terminology:  the  "option 
value" of work. 
The provisions  of firm  pension  plans that have motivated  our work are 
described  in the next section.  The option  value  model  is described  in aecrion 
II.  Results  are presented  and the model fit is discussed  in section III. 
-1- Simulations  of illustrative  potential  changes  in pension  plan provisions  are 
presented  in section  IV.  A summary  and conclusions  are in section  V. 
I.  Background 
A.  Firm  Pension  Plan Provisions. 
Approximately  75 percent  of American  workers  are covered  by defined 
benefit  pension  plans.  These  plans  proaiee  the employee  a benefit at 
retirement  that is typically  based on  age, years  of  service,  and his  final 
salary (or an  average  of earnings  in the last few years  of employment). 
Within  this general  framework,  the benefit  formulas  of most plans  provide  a 
large incentive  to remain  with the firm until some age and then  a substantial 
incentive  to leave  the firm  at some later age.  The specific  provisions  of 
firm  plans, however,  vary enormously.  Thus the incentives  for retirement  or 
departure  from  the firm  vary widely  among  firms.  Jhe incentives  of plan 
provisions  and their  variation  among  plans  are described  in detail  by 
Kotlikoff  and Wise [1985]  Because  the incentives  vary so greatly  among 
plans,  to  analyze  the effects  of plan  provisions  on  retirement,  it is 
necessary  to account  for the precise  provisions  of an employee's  plan.  It is 
also critical  to have information  on past  and current  earnings  in the firm. 
For these  reasons,  we rely  on firm  personnel  records for this analysis. 
The easiest  way to understand  the incentive  effects  of pension  plans  is 
to consider  the relationship  between  age and total compensation 
- -  including 
1See also  Bulow [1981], Lazear [1983], Clark  and McDermed [1984], Fields 
and Mitchell [1985], Frant  and Leonard  [1987). 
-2- wage earnings,  the accrual  of future pension  benefits,  and the accrual  of 
future  Social  Security  benefits.  Table  1 preaents  forecasts  of wage earnings 
and projected  penaion and Social  Security  benefits  for a representative 
employee  drawn  from  our data set.  Rased  on the forecasts,  this individual, 
who is 50 years  old,  will  have slightly  declining  real  wage earnings  over the 
next 15 years, with more rapidly  declining  earnings  in his late 60's.  The 
annual pension  and Social Security  benefits  he would  receive,  were  he to 
retire at the indicated  age, are given  in the final  three columns. 
Figure  1 shows  the present  value of  the future  wage earnings  and 
retirement  benefits  presented  in table 1, graphed  against  age of  retirement. 
The curve  labelled  earnings  is the present value,  at  50, of cumulated 
earnings;  thus  the slope  ia the discounted  annual  wage rate.  (Forecasted 
future earnings  are based  on the experience  of other  employees  in the firm, 
and on the past earnings  of this individual.  The estimation  procedure  is 
described  below.)  The retirement  benefita  rune shows  the present  value  of 
expected  penaion  plus Social  Security  benefits,  by age of  retirement.  The 
slope  of this curve indicates  the annual  accrual  of retirement  benefits.  The 
accrual  of firm  pension  benefits  is negative  for this  individual  after  age 60. 
The cop curve shows  total compensation,  the aum of wage earnings  and the 
accrual  of retirement  benefits.  After  age 62 or 63, total compensation  from 
working  an additional  year is essentially  zero.  The sharp kinks in the total 
compensation  curve  are due to the discontinuous  accrual  of pension  benefits. 
The pension  accrual  is the result of  several  important  provisions  of the 
firm's pension  plan.  Possibly  the moat important  provision  pertains  to  ear].y 
retirement  benefits.  If  a person  leaves  this  firm  before age 55,  early 
retirement  benefits  can be taken beginning  at age 55,  but the benefit  will be 
the normal  retirement  benefit 
-  -  that would  be received  at age 65 - - 
-3- Table 1 
Earnings  Pension  Benefits, and SS Benefits  for a Representative  Individual 
Earnings 
Age  Forecast 
Annual Pension  Benefits 
Normal  Social  Security  Adjusted 
50  22317  2764  4533 
51  22389  2900  4723 
52  22327  3010  4914 
53  22330  3221  5102 
54  22275  3271  5288 
55  22172  9522  6251  5465 
56  22024  10884  7047  5640 
57  21832  12465  8006  5771 
58  21593  14173  9035  5798 
59  21310  16272  10394  5822 
60  20981  18546  11861  5842 
61  20610  19739  12647  5863 
62  20196  20989  13473  5885 
63  19742  22309  14346  6305 
64  19250  23652  15219  6538 
65  18721  15756  6757 
66  18158  16809  6546 
67  17564  17847  6349 
68  16943  18862  6167 
Notes:  All values are in 1980 dollars,  calculated  assuming  a 5 percent 
inflation  rate.  Income  forecasts  were computed  using the estimated 
income  forecasting  equation shown  in appendix  B.  The  individual  was 50 
years old on January  1, 1981,  the date to which these  calculations 
correspond;  he will accumulate  30 years of experience  during the year in 
which he reaches  age 60.  The adjusted  pension  benefits are paid until 
he is 65, and are only available  if he retires  between ages 55 and 65. 
The social security  benefits  are unavailable  until he is 62; the 
reported  benefits correspond  to the benefits  he would receive if he 
collected  them starting  at age 62, or during  the first  year of his 


































































































































































































































































































































































































 actuarially  raduced  to age 55.  If,  however,  the person  staye  in  the firm 
until age 55, early retirement  benefits  can be taken  immediately  and the early 
retirement  reduction  factor  is much less than  actuarial.  In  addition,  the 
benefit  formula  includes a Social  Security offset  after age 65;  pension 
benefits  are reduced depending  on  the person'a  Social  Security benefits.  but 
the offset  is not applied  to benefits received between  55 and 65, the normal 
retirement  age.  This is a second  important  feature of  the plan.  These 
provisions  mean  that there is a large incentive  to stay in the firm  until  55. 
After  55, the incentive  ia reduced.  For the person  represented  in the graph, 
there is a sharp reduction  in  the accrual of  pension benefits  at  age 60, due 
to the third important  feature of the plan.  If  the person  has 30  years  of 
service at age 60,  he is entitled to full normal  retirement  benefits.  That 
is, by continuing  to work  he will  no  longer gain  from  fewer years  of  early 
retirement  reduction,  as he did before age 60.  Other plan  provisions  are not 
discussed here,  but are described  in  detail  in Kotlikoff  and Wise [1987] 
3.  Prior  Emphasis  on Social Security  Provisions. 
The incentive  effects  inherent in the firm pension plan  provisions  are 
much  more important  than  thoae resulting from  Social Security  provisions. 
Indeed, this  is typically  the case.  Yet most  prior  research on retirement 
behavior  has been  directed  to the effects of Social  Security provisions. 
Recent  examples  are Blinder, Gordon  and Wise [1980]  ,  Burkhauaer [1980]  ,  Hard 
and Boakin  [1981], Gustman  and Steinmeier  [1986], Burtless  and  Moffitt  [1984] 
Burtlesa  [1986], Hauaman  and Wise  [1985].  With  few exceptions,  (Hurd and 
Boakin  [1981] end, to some  extent, Hauaman and  Wise [1985]), these studies 
suggest only  a  modest  effect of  Social Security  provisions  on  retirement 
behavior.  In  contrast,  there has been  very little work relating  retirement 
-4- behavior  of covered workers  to the retirement  incentives  provided  by  their 
pension  plans.2  The apparent ceason  for this lack of attention  has been the 
absence of appropriate  data. 
Figure 
1.  suggests  three key requirements  for analysis  of the retirement 
effects  of pension  provisions.  First,  the data must include the precise 
provisions  of  the individual's  pension plsn, together  with information  on 
prior  earnings  records.  Second, the estimation method  must account  for sharp 
jumps  or drops in  pension accrual  in  future years.  For example,  in 
considering  whether  a  person  will leave the firm at  age 50, it is critical  to 
account for the large  "bonus" that  he will get if he remains until  age 55; 
consideration  only  of  total  compensation at age 50 is not sufficient.  Third, 
the estimation  method  needs  to account for the fact that individual 
circunistancea, auth  as the level of wage  earnings,  change over time.  Such 
changes  in turn affect  future pension  and Social Security  accrual.  The 
combination  of firm  data  and the estimation method  proposed  here  is intended 
to meet these requirements. 
C.  Prior  Eatimation  Methods. 
To  date,  in addition  to least squares regression,  two basic  approaches 
have been  used to analyze retirement  behavior.  The first  is the method  of 
estimation  developed  to analyze  the choices of individuals  who face 
discontinuous  or kinked  budget  constraints.  The second  approach  is the 
continuous  time failure rate or hazard  model.  Since  retirement  ia typically  a 
discrete outcome,  but also has  a time dimenaion  (age) which  not only 
2Exceptions  are Fields and  Mitchell  [1982],  Kotlikoff  and Wise [1988] 
Burkhauser  [1979]  ,  Hogarth  [1988] 
-5- characterizes  retirement  but may also affect  the desire  for it,  it is natural 
to describe retirement  within  the context of a continuous  time  qualitative 
choice  model.  These  two approaches  are described briefly  in  turn. 
The adaptation  of non-linear budget  constraint  analysis  to retirement  may 
be called  the "lifetime  budget  constraint"  approach.  The central feature  of 
this method  is a lifetime budget  constraint  analogous  to the standard  labor- 
leisure budget  constraint, but with  annual hours  of work replaced by  years  of 
labor  force participation,  snd annual  earnings  replaced by  cumulative  life- 
time  compensation.  The optimal age of  retirement  is determined  by a utility 
function  defined over  years  of  work (post-retirement  years  of  leisure)  and 
cumulative  compensation.  A  careful application of this approach  to retirement 
is by Burtlers  [1986]  ,  who  analyzed  the  effects  of changes in  Social  Security 
benefits  on the retirement.3 
While  appealing  in  many respects,  this procedure  has an important 
drawback.  It implicitly  assumes that individuals know  with certainty  the 
opportunities  -- like wage rates --  that will  be available  to them in the 
distant  future.  Although  it  is plausible  to assume that  so  individual  knows 
his wage rate for the purposes  of estimating  annual  labor supply,  the simple 
extension  of  this idea to construct  a lifetime budget  constraint  is not as 
plausible.  How much does s 50-year-old person  know about his wage at  67? 
Concomitant with this assumption,  the method  makes no allowance  for updating 
of  information  about  future  opportunities  as the individual  ages. 
3An analogous  model  was used by  Venti  and Wise [1984] to describe  the 
rent  paid  by low income  families faced with  discontinuous  budget  constrsints. 
Earlier papers  that develop these  techniques  are Hmusmmn  sod Wise [1980] and 
Burtless  and  Hmusmsn  [1978] 
-6- The hazard  model approach  aa implemenred  to dare is essentially  a 
reduced-form  technique designed  to capture the effects on retirement  of 
movements  in variables  such as Social  Security wealth.  Implementations  of  the 
hazard  model have not been  as "forward looking"  as the non-linear  budget 
constraint  specifications.  It  is natural under  this specification,  however, 
to update  information  as individuals  age.  For example,  if an  individual  has 
not retired at age t it  is convenient  to describe  the probability  of 
retirement  by age t+l in  terms of  variables  such  as annual wage  earnings  snd 
private  pension  accruals up to age t and in terms of  these values  in  the 
period  t to  t+l; but it  is nor natural  to  consider values  of these variables 
in future  years.  Thus in  Hsusman and  Wise fl985}, for example,  changes  from 
the current period  to the next,  in  esrnings, pension  wealth,  and the increment 
to pension wealth,  are sllowed to affect  the decision  to retire in  the next 
period, but these vslues  seversl years  hence sre not.  On the other hand,  it 
is easy within  this framework  to allow a flexible  specification.  In 
particular,  different  forms of monetary  compensation  can  be entered separately 
with no increase in  computational  complexity.  And possibly  more  important  for 
retirement,  unexpected  shocks, like sudden changes  in  earnings enter  the 
analysis  very  naturally. 
The hazard  model  is commonly  thought to have  no apparent utility 
maximization  interpretation.4  It is shown in  Appendix A, however,  that,  in 
fact,  it does have such  an  interpretation,  end that it is a special case  of 
the model  developed  in this paper. 
4The  Brownian  motion  model  described  in  Hausman  and Wise [1985]  can be 
assigned  such  an interpretation,  but it is difficult  to estimate with 
variables  that change  over time. 
-7- II.  The Option Value Model 
The model proposed  here  incorporates  the advantages  of both of  the 
approaches  described  above.  It  allows  updating  of information,  as does the 
traditional  hazard  model, but also  considers  potential  compensation  many years 
in  the future, as does the nonlinear budget  constraint  approach.  Antecedents 
of  our work  begin  with  Lazear  and  Moore  [1988], who argue that  the option 
value  of postponing  retirement  is the appropriate variable  to enter  in a 
regression  equation  explaining  retirement.5  Our model  is close  in  spirit  to 
the stochastic  dynamic programming  model of Rust [1988a]  . A  dynamic 
5lndeed  it  was their work  and analysis of military  retirement  rates by 
Phillips  and  Wise [1987] that motivated  us to pursue  this approach. 
6Rust'a  ]1988a  model poses  substantially  greater numerical  complexity 
than ours and has not yet been  estimated  for retirement.  In principle,  he 
observes  not only  the individual's  retirement  age, but subaequent  consumption 
decisions  as well.  Thus his model  allows the individual  to optimize  over age 
of retirement  and future  consumption  jointly.  The choices are assumed to be 
equivalent  to  the solution  to a dynamic programming  problem.  As in  our case, 
the individual's  expectations  are conditioned  on  current known variables  like 
income.  The idea is to  recover  the parameters  of a utility function  specified 
in  terms  of  these  choice variables.  In  practice,  though, he uses income  to 
describe  consumption  (Rust [l988b]), with a  value  funetion  similar to ours, 
specified  in  terms of  income.  To simplify  the solution  to the dynamic 
programming  problem  in his model, he assumes that  random  unobserved  individual 
components  are independent  over  time, whereas we allow such  terms  in  our model 
(representing  differences among  individuals  in  health  status,  desire  for 
leisure,  and the like) to be correlated.  In  short, Rust  has described  a 
solution  to a more complicated  choice than  ours, but with  uncorrelated  errors, 
whereas  ours is a solution  to a less complex problem,  but with  correlated 
errors. 
-8- programming  model  of employment  behavior has alao been  proposed  by Berkovec 
and Stern [l988].  Neither Rust  nor Berkovec  and Stern, however,  have 
information  on  private pension plan  provisions,  the focus of  our analysis. 
Our strategy  is to simplify  the general stochastic  programming  problem to 
facilitate  its otherwise  burdensome  econometric  implementation.  These 
simplifications  reduce  the computational  requirements  substantially  while 
retaining  the key forward-looking  features  of the dynamic programming 
approach. 
The key ideas of the model can  be summarized  briefly.  It is intended  to 
capture an important  empirical  regularity,  the irreversibility  of  the 
retirement  decision.  Although  it is  not uncommon  to work - -  at least part- 
time -- after  "retirement,"  it is rare  to return  to the job from which  one has 
retired.  The model  focuses on  the opportunity  cost of  retiring or, 
equivalently,  on  the value  of  retaining  the option  to retire at a later  date. 
It has two key aspects.  The first is that  a person  will continue  to work at 
any age if the option  value  of continuing  work is greater than the value of 
7Berkovec  and Stern's analysis  is also in  progress.  They consider 
transitions  among  three employment  states  over time.  To simplify  the solution 
to  their  optimization  problem,  they, like Rust,  assume  that disturbance  terms 
are uncorrelared  over time.  Their anslysis  is in terms of individual 
attributes  like education,  race, health  status, and age.  Oovernment benefits 
like Social  Security  are not explicitly  modeled,  whereas  these benefits,  as 
well as firm  pension benefits play the central role in  our analysis.  We 
estimate  a discount,  or  weighting  factor, whereas  they obtain  estimates  of 
other  parameters  conditional  on an  assumed discount  rate.  Age itself  is used 
explicitly  to estimate retirement.  As will  be emphasized  below,  age is not a 
direct  determinant  of  retirement  in  our model.  This has important 
implications  if  the model  is to be used  to predict  the effect  of changes in 
firm  pension  plan  or Social Security provisions  on  retirement. 
-9- immediate  retirement.  In  effect,  the person  compares the heat of expected 
future  posaihilities  -- the  option  vaiue  of  continuing  to work -- with  the 
value  of retiring now.  The second  is that the individual  reevaluates  this 
retirement  decision  as more information  about future  earnings 
- -  and  thus 
future  retirement benefits  -- becomes available with age.  For example,  a 
decline  in  the wage  between  ages 56 and 57 will cause the individual  to 
reassess  future wage earnings,  and thus future pension benefits  and Social 
Security  accrual as well.  Thus retirement  may seem more  advantageous  upon 
reaching 57 than it was expected  to be at age 56.  Retirement  occurs when  the 
value  of  continuing  work falls below  the value  of  retiring. 
Because  the model  is somewhat  complex in its details,  it  is useful  to 
know  whether  a simpler model  could capture the important  features  of this one: 
in  particular,  whether  a model  that is easier  to implement  could  predict 
retirement  outcomes  as well as the more complex model.  Ic is shown  in 
appendix  A that a simplified  version of  the model  developed here has an  almost 
direct  hazard  model  counterpart.  Indeed, as is shown  in  the appendix,  the 
proportional  hazard  model can be interpreted in  terms of utility  maximization, 
contrary  to a common  misperception.  Hazard  models  are very simple  to 
estimate,  Unfortunately,  the hazard  model  is obtained only  after  imposing 
strong  restrictions  on several important  features of the option  value model. 
In addition to  the general rationale  for the option  value  model, the 
precise  specification  as set forth  in this paper  is guided  by two 
considerations:  first, by the features of  the firm data that are used in 
estimation,  and second, by the primary goal of  the model,  to predict  the 
result  of  changes  in firm  pension plan  provisions.  In  particular,  some 
individual  attributes  that  might be expected to affect  retirement  behavior  - - 
such as assets  other  than  pension  and Social  Security wealth  - -  are  unknown to 
-  10  - us.8  Our retirement  decision  function  is therefore  based  on  wage earnings  and 
retirement  benefit  income,  In the absence of additional  information, we 
propose  an  error  structure  rhat  ía intended  to capture  the effecta  of 
persistent  unobserved  individual  attributes. 
A.  The model. 
Consider  an individual  at the beginning  of year  t, who  has not yet 
retired.  Looking  ahead, he will  receive wage income  in  year a as long  aa 
he continues  to  work;  if he is retired in  year a,  he will receive real 
retirement  benefits  8.  (We adopt the convention  that if a is the firat 
calendar year during  which the person has no wage  earnings,  he is assumed  to 
have left the firm  during  the previous  year, at the age that  he was on  January 
1 of year  a.)  Let r denote  the first full year of the individual's  retirement 
(that is,  the first  year in  which the individual has no wage  earnings).  As 
described  above,  these benefits will  depend  on the person's  age and years of 
service  at retirement,  and on  his earnings history;  thus we typically write 
8Thile  assets other  than  retirement  annuity wealth  (the present value  of 
firm pension  and Social  Security benefits)  should in  principle  affect 
retirement,  prior  analysis  shows that their effect  is small relative  to Social 
Security wealth,  as demonstrated  in Hauaman and Wise  [1985), for example.  In 
addition,  prior work  has shown that a large majority  of the elderly have  very 
little wealth  other  than housing  and firm pension  and Social  Security 
annuities  (e.g. Oiaaond and  Hauaman  [1984], Hurd and Shoven  [1983], Hurd and 
Wiae  [1988]) and that housing wealth  is typically not consumed  as the elderly 
age (Merrill  [1984], Venti and Wise [1988], Feinstein  and McFadden  [1988]). 
Indeed, non-housing  bequeathable  wealth  is reduced very little as the elderly 
age  (e.g. Venti  and Wiae  [1988], Bernheim  [1987]).  Thus there  is substantial 
evidence  that the typical  retired person  is living  largely from Social 
Security  and pension benefits. 
-  11  - B(r) 
To develop a decision  function relative  to retirement,  suppoae  that the 
individual  indirectly  derives  utility Uw(Ys) from the real income  earned while 
working,  and utility Ur(Bs(t))  from  the pension benefits  received  while 
retired.  Suppose  that in  deciding whether  to retire  the individual  weights 
future  income  (or utility)  by the discount factor  fi,  and that  with  probability 
one he will die by year S.  If  he retires at  age r,  the weighted,  or 
discounted,  value  received  over  the remainder  of  his life is: 
(2.1)  V(r)  XLfi5tUw(Ys)  + 
Thus the value function Vt(t)  depends on  future  earnings  and retirement 
benefits,  which in turn  depend  on  the age r at  which  he retires. 
The individual  must  choose  either  to work during year t,  so thst r > t, 
or to  retire, so that r — t.  Assume  that he makes  the decision  by comparing 
the expected value  he would  receive were  he to retire  now,  at r  t,  with  the 
greatest of the expected  values from  possible  retirement  dates r > t in the 
future.  Let  denote  the individual's  expectation  about  future 
circumstances,  based  on information  available  to him at  the beginning  of year 
t.  (With this convention,  real income  earned  during year  t is not known at 
the beginning  of  year t.) 
The expected  gsin,  st time  t, from postponing  retirement  to age t is then 
given by 
(2.2)  G(r) — EtVt(r) 
- EtVt(t). 
-  12  - In  the firm  that  provided  our data,  retirement  is msndatory  at  age 70. 
Thus we assume that the individual  considers  potential  retirement  ages between 
t+l and the year  of  his seventieth  birthday,  t70.  Let r* be the retirement 
age with the highest  expected  value,  that is 
(2.3)  r* solves maxrc(t+lt÷2  t70tvt(t) 
The individual  retires  if  there  is no expected gain  from  continued  work,  that 
is,  if  Gt(r*) 
= EtVt(r*) 
- EtVt(t) < 0.  Otherwise  he postpones  retirement. 
In  short, he 
(2.4)  Retires at r > t if:  Ct(r*) 
— EtVt(r*) 
- EtVt(t) > 0 
We assume  that the utility derived  indirectly  from  annual  income has a 
constant  relative  risk  aversion  form, with  additive  individual  disturbance 
terms distributed  independently  of income and age.  Specifically, 
(2.5a)  U(Y)  Y  + 
(2.5b)  (k35(r))T 
+ 
where  and  are individual-specific  random  effects.  They  are intended  to 
capture several unobserved  determinants  of  retirement.  For example, w  and 
could reflect  individual  preferences  for  work  versus  leisure.  Or, they could 
reflect health  status.  They  could  reflect differences  among  individuals in 
unobserved  wealth  and other  variables  that may affect  retirement  decisions. 
Given  the nature  of our data,  they  are also likely  to reflect  the fact that 
for some persons  the alternative  to  continued work in  the firm  is not 
-  13 
- retirement,  but another job, an issue that we return  to below.  We presume 
that, for a given individual,  there  should be considerable  persistence  in 
these random  effects over time.  For example, a disability  that affects the 
burden  of  working,  and thus corresponds  to a negative  w, is likely  to yield  a 
negative Us+l as well.  Such  persistence  is captured by assuming  that the 
random  individual  effects follow  a Markovian  or first order autoregressive 
process: 
(2.6a)  w5 
= pw51  + 6wa 
'  )  = 0, 
(2.6b)  =  +  ,  E5(€5) 
= 0, 
for s—t+l  S.  We give particular  attention  in the empirical  work to the 
case with  p =  1,  with  the individual  effects evolving  according  to a randoa 
walk.  We adopt  the convention  that at time s  the individual  knows  and 
but not their valuea  at a + 1  and subsequent  ages;  future  forecasts  of  w and 
are based  on (2.6). 
With the parameterization  (2.5), G(r) in (2.3) becomes, 
(2.7)  G(r)  Et85t[(Y7)+w} 
+ EtZS$5t1jkB(r))7+E] 
- EtXt$5t[(kB5(t))7÷E5] 
= EtXfi5t(Y)  + EtSfi5t(kB(r))7 
-  EtXStfi5t(kBa(t))7 
+ E585tw  + Etr5ate 
- Et_.tfltEs 
— g(r) + 
-  14  - where g(r) and (r)  distinguish  the terms in G(r) containing  the random 
effects,  w and E  from  the other terms. 
If  whether  the person  is  alive  in  future years  is statistically 
independent  of  his earnings  stream  and the individual  effects u  and E5, then 
g(r) and $(r) become 
(2.8)  g(r)  yr-lstm(sIt)E(y7) 
+ Xr$5t5Jt)ts(r))7] 
and 
(2.9)  (r) 
= Xtfl5ts(aJtEwe) 
where  ir(slt)  denotes  the probability  that the person  will be alive  in year s, 
given  that he is alive  in  year t.  Given  the random  Markov  assumption  (2.6), 
can be written  as 
(2.10)  (r) 
= rlst(slt)at(e) 
— 
where  K(r) 
— CBp)5t1r(slt)  and  —  -  The  simplification 
results  from the fact  that  at time t the expected value  of  zi  u5 
-  is 
for all future years a.  Thus the individual  random  component (r) 
depends  only on  the random  effect at  time t (together with  $ and p)  .  The  term 
K(r) cumulates  the deflators  that  yield  the present value  in year  t of the 
future  expected values of the random components  of  utility.  The further  r is 
in  the future, the larger  is K(r).  That  is, the more  distant  the potential 
-  15  - retirement  ege,  the greeter the unrertainty  ebout  it,  yielding  a 
hereroakedastir  disturbance  term.  This heteroskedastic  property  is apparently 
an  important  determinant  the model's ability to  predict  departure  rates 
accurately  for  both younger and older employees,  as shown  below. 
Combining  (2.7)-(2.lO), C(r) may be written  simply  as 
(2.11)  C(r) 
— g(r) + 
B.  The probability  of retiring. 
I.  Retirement  probabilities  for a single year.  The year  in which  an 
individual  retires  is a random variable;  we call it R.  The probability  that 
an individual  in the sample in year  t-l retires  in year t,  that is Pr[R  = t] 
is the relevant  probability when  using  cross-sectional  data  for a single  year 
t.  The probability  that the individual chooses not to retire  is Pr(R > t] 
From (2.4), an individual will retire  in year t if Ct(r)  < 0 for all 
re[t+l  T).  Thus: 
(2.12)  Pr[R—tJ — Pr[Ct(r)  < 0 V re(t+l  T)J 
= Pr[g(r)+K(r)v  < 0 V re(t+l  T)J 
= Pr[g(r)/IK(r) <  V re{t+l  T)]. 
Alternatively,  the final  expression  in (2.12) can be  written: 
(2.13)  Pr[R=t] = Pr[g(r)/K(4) < 
where 4  is the value  of r that solves 
-  16  - (2.14)  maxre(t+1 .  g(r)/K(r). 
Because  the individual  either  retires  at t or he does not, 
Pr[R>t]  1  -  Pr{R—t]. 
2.  Retirement  probabilities  for multiple years.  The data  set analyzed 
below  contains  data  on individual  retirement  decisions  for several consecutive 
years.  To analyze these data tequires computing  the probability  that the 
individual  tetires in year r.  In general, suppose that  the retirement  status 
is observed  for years  t  T.  An individual  in the sample  in year t-l 
retires  in year rct  T) if there  is no earlier age when  he considers  it 
optimal  to retire, and if it is  optimal to retire in  year r based  on equation 
(2.4).  If it had not been optimal to  retire in year  t,  there would  have  been, 
at time  t,  at least one future  r with  G(r) > 0.  This would occur  if and only 
if it were true for the r  that maximized  g(r)/K(r),  evaluated  at year t. 
That  is, it  requires  that g(r)/K(r) > -vt.  The same  would  have to be 
true  for every year t through year r-l.  In year  r, however,  retirement  is 
optimal,  so that g1/K(r) 
< -v.  Thus 
(2.15)  Pr[R—r]  Pr[g(r)/K(r) 
> -v 
> 
g(r)/K7(r)  < 
Equation  (2.15) can be used  to compute the probability  that R  r for 
r=t  T.  The remaining possible  event is that the individual  does not 
retire during  the period  of the data.  The probability  of  this event  is 
-  17  - (2.16)  Pr[R>T]  Pr(g(r)/Ic(r) > t 
> 
g(4)/IC2(r)  > 
The retirement  model  thus reduces to a multinomial  discrete  choice 
problem,  with dependent  error terms v5.  Thus far, the only  assumption  about 
the individual  effects is that  they  are Markov.  Empirical  implementation, 
however,  requires  additional  distributional  assumptions.  We assume that 
follows a Gaussian  Markov  process,  with 
(2.17)  v5 
=  + c,  i.i.d. 
where  the initial value,  xi, is i.i.d. N(O,o) and is independent of 
s=t+l  S.  The covariance  between  VT and  is pvar(VT),  and the variance 
of  a  for r ￿  t is  2(r-t) + ()1p23)c2.  In the random walk 
case, with  p — I,  the covariance  between  and  is var(VT),  and the 
variance  of v. for  r  t  is  ÷ (r-t)o.  Thus there  are two equivalent 
ways  to see that uncertainty  about  the future  is reduced  as the planning 
horizon  is shortened,  presumably  as the person  approaches  typical retirement 
ages.  First,  their  are fewer  future random  components  of  utility  to cumulate 
in  the K(r) term (see equation 2.10).  Second,  the uncertainty  about  the 
value  of future random  effects is reduced  -  -  the  Msrkov  assumption  yields 
decreasing  var(u)  as the planning  horizon  is shortened.  In  particular,  in a 
given  calender  year,  the uncertainty  about  the retirement  decisions  of  younger 
persons  is greater  than the uncertainty  about older  employees.  This property 
-  18 
- plays  a key role in  providing  the flexibility  that allows  the model to fit the 
departure  behavior  of younger as well  as older  employees. 
In  aummary:  conditional on (g5(r)/K5(r)), 
s—t  r,  the 
probability  that year r is the first year  of retirement  is given  by (2.15), 
while  (2.16) gives  the probability  that the person  does not retire during  the 
years  t  T.  These  probabilities  are evaluated  by  computing  the appropriate 
integrals  over  a multivariate  normal  density, where  the error  term follows  the 
Markov  process  (2.17).  The unknown  parameters  of the model are y, k, fi,  and 
the variance  parameters  a3, e, and  p. 
C.  Evaluation  of g(r)/K(rt). 
To determine g(r)/K(r)  requires evaluation  of  the expectations 
Et(Y) and E(kB5(r))7 
for s ￿  t.  In the empirical work,  the 
conditional  expectation  of  the first of these terms is  approximated  by the 
conditional  expectation  of its second  order Taylor  series  expansion  around  the 
mean  of a stream  of earnings forecasts  computed  for each individual.9  The 
pension  and Social  Security benefits  depend on the entire  earnings  stream  of 
the individual  through his last year of  work.  The expectation  E(kB5(r))7 was 
approximated  by (kE5(r))7, 
where  5(r) is the pension  benefit  calculated 
using  the mean  earnings  forecasts  for the individual  through year r-l, based 
nn nbserved earnings  through year t-lJ° 
9Et(Y)  {l + (1/2)y(Tl)E{(YEY)/EtYJ2)(EtY)7. 
This term ia 
evaluated  assuming  that E[(Y5-EY5)/EtY5]2  (st)var(e),  where 
var(e)  SEE2  from the lnY  regression,  explained  in appendix  B. 
101n  principle,  the expectation could  be evaluated  using Monte  Carlo 
methods  to determine  the variance  of B(r).  Then a Taylor  series  expansion, 
like the procedure  used to evaluate Et(Y), could  be used  to evaluate 
E(kB5(r))7.  The Monte  Carlo procedure  would  entail  computation  of  the 
benefits  that  an individual  would  receive for a given  income  stream, where  the 
future part of  the income stream  is drawn  from  an  estimated  distribution  of 
-  ip  - The income forecasts  for each  individual  were generated  by a aetond ordet 
autoregreaaion.  The autoregression  wes estimated usin'  the individual 
earnings  hiatories  of all salesmen  employed at least three years, with 
earnings  converted  to 1980 dollars using the Consumer Price  Index.  The 
parameters  of  the forecasting model  depend on  age, At yeara  of  service, 5 
and an interaction  term, with 
(2.18)  tlnY = So(At,St)  + Si(AtSt)tlnY 1 + S2(A,S)AlnY 2 + e 
The estimated  equation  exhibits regression  toward the mean; l  + 2 C 0  for 
typical  values  of At and  in  the sample.  The estimated  parameters  of 
equation  (2.18) are shown  in  appendix B. 
IV.  Results 
The option  value model  has been estimated based  on a sample of  1500 
salesmen  50  years  of  age or older on  January  1,  1981, selected  at random  from 
the firm  data.  All persons  in  the sample are men performing  similar jobs.  To 
facilitate  earnings forecasts,  the sample was restricted  to  persons who had at 
least  three years  of service before  1980, the first  year of  our retirement 
future  income  streams.  However,  the pension and Social  Security calculations 
are quite  cumbersome.  Beyond  its substantial  computational  advantages,  a 
justification  for the approximation  that we use is that the benefits 
calculations  involve the entire  earnings history  of  the individual.  At least 
for values  of r in  the near future, the unknown elements  in these calculations 
are small. 
-  20  - analysis. 
Initial estimates  were obtained based only on  retirement  decisions  in  one 
year,  1980 - -  whether  1981 was the first full year of  retirement,  by our 
accounting  convention.  Expected  pension benefits  are based  on the provisions 
of the firm  plan.  Social  security benefits were computed  according  to the 
provisions  in  the Social  Security Bulletin  (1982), based  on individual wage 
histories  at the firm)-1  Estimstea  based on the 1980  retirement  decisions  are 
reported  firsr, followed  by  estimates  base on  three  consecutive  years. 
A.  One year. 
1.  Parameter  Estimates 
Maximum  likelihood  parameter  estimates  are shown  in  table 2.  Estimated 
parameters  of seversi variants of the option  value  model  are shown in  the 
second  panel of the table.  Estimates  in this table were  obtained  under the 
assumption  that  the random  individual  effects follow  a random walk;  p is set 
to 1.  (Unrestricted  estimates  are reported in the next  section.)  The first 
panel  reports estimstes  based  on  the assumption  that  all employees hsve the 
same constsnt  probability  of retiring  (model 1), or that  all persons  of  the 
same age have the ssme retirement  probability  (model 2). 
Estimates  of the parameters  of  the option  value model  are shown  in the 
last  row of the table.  The estimate of  -y  is 1.00, suggesting  that, in 
deciding  whether  to retire,  individual valuation  of income  is linear in  future 
earnings.  Earnings without  work, retirement  benefits,  are valued  at 1.66 
obtain  pension  and Social  Security forecasts  for persons who joined 
the firm  before  1969--the  first year  of  our data--backward  predictions  based 
on the estimated  earnings  equation were  used to estimste  earnings  before  1969. 
-  21  - Table 2 
Parameter Estimates Based on Retirement Decisions in One Year, 1980a 
A.  Models Without Earnings and Retirement Benefit Terms: 
1.  Constant Ofll  -579.58 
2.  Age Dummy Variables  -477.92 
B.  Option Value Models, with p = 1: 
-y  k  a(xlQ5)  L 
3  1b  1b  .140  -413.70 
(.006) 
4  1b  1b  .782  .123  -413.191 
(.212)  (.020) 
5.  1.00  1.66  0.847  .119  -397.72 
(.07)  (.02)  (.032)  (.001) 
aThe sample size is 1500.  A person was counted as having retired if he 
had no earnings in 1981;  that is, he was retired by January  1,  1981.  £ 
is the log likelihood value.  bp  value imposed. 
—21a— times wage earnings while employed,  based  on the estimated  value  of  k.  That 
is, a petson  would exchange  a dollar with  work for 60 cents not accompanied by 
work.  The weight  given  to current  versus  future  income in the retirement 
decision  is indicated  by , estimated  to be  .847.  All of the parameters  are 
measured  quite  precisely,  with the possible exception  of $ (with a standard 
error  of .032),  and each of  the estimates  seems quite  plausible  to us. 
Although  a strong  interpretation  of the parameters  of  the model  might  treat  $ 
aa a general measure  of individuals'  pure rate of time preference,  independent 
from  the decision  to which  it  applies,  it is probably  more realistic  to think 
of it as a weight  specific  to the retirement  decision.  Under  either 
interpretation,  a priori  judgments  about its value  surely  vary  widely.  It 
cannot  be observed  and can typically be estimated  only indirectly.  Tt is, 
however,  estimated  directly  in the option value  model.  The estimated  value  is 
undoubtedly  sensitive  to the model  specification;  but under  either 
interpretation  it is nonetheless  surprising  to us that it is measured  as 
precisely  ss it is. 
Estimated  parameters  of  simplified  versions  of the model  are shown  ss 
versions  3 and 4.  The only estimated parameter  in  model  3 is the varisnre 
Yet  judging  by the large difference  in  the likelihood  values  the option 
value model fits the data  much  better  than  the specification  based  on a full 
set of  age dummy variables,  as reported  in  model  2.  Thus there  is substantial 
information  in  the option  value  measures.  With  age dummy  variables,  the 
astimsted  average departure  rate for each age matches  the actual  rate.  The 
option  vslue  specification  does not assure  such a match.  But because 
departure  rates very greatly  among persons of the same age, the option  value 
model  fits much  better.  The option  value model captures  the variation,  given 
age;  the dummy variable  model  does not. 
-  22  - 2.  The Model Fit 
The model  fit is demonstrated  by comparing  actual  and predicted 
retirement  rates, shown  in  table  3.  Both  the predicted  annual  rates and 
predicted  cumulative  retirement  are very  close  to the actual values.  In 
particular,  the model  captures  each  of the important  jumps in  the departure 
rates.  The actual  retirement  race at 55 is .078; the predicted  rate is  .075. 
Of  persons who are employed  at age 50,  the actual proportion  that  has left by 
age 54 is  .139,  as shown in the forth column  of the table.  The model 
prediction  is .116.  The actual  proportion  that  has  left jumps  to .206 at  55, 
the predicted  proportion  to .182.  Again at age 60, the actual  proportion 
jumps  from .488 to .599, the predicted  proportion  from  .483 to .583.  At age 
62,  the actual  proportion  jumps  from .675 to .824 snd the predicted  proportion 
from  .680 to .823.  Only  at ages 65 and 66 do  the predicted  rates differ 
noticeably  from the actual  ones, but chere  are very few observations  at these 
ages.  In  sddicion,  only  about  5 percent  of  persons  employed  at 50 would  still 
be employed  at 65, based  on the actual  departure  rates. 
To provide  an external check  of  the predictive  validity  of  the model, 
parameter  estimates  based  on 1980 retirement  decisions  were used to predict 
1981 departure  rates, thst  on  average were  higher  than  in  1980.  Actual  versus 
predicted cumulative  departure  rates, based  on actusl  versus  predicted 
departure  rates by age, provide  a summary of the results.  At ages 60 and 62, 
they  are as follows:12 
12The  1981 comparison  is based  on  1305 observations. 
-  23  - Table 3 
Predicted versus Actual Retirement Rates b  Age, Based on the Single- 




Annual  Retirement Rates  Cumulative Rates 
Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted 
50  36  0000  0.025  0.000  0.025 
51  131  0.053  0.037  0.053  0.061 
52  132  0.015  0.026  0.068  0.086 
53  123  0.041  0.024  0.106  0.108 
54  106  0.038  0.009  0.139  0.116 
55  129  0.078  0.075  0.206  0.182 
56  137  0.117  0.073  0.299  0.241 
57  123  0.089  0.108  0.362  0.323 
58  107  0.084  0.102  0.415  0.392 
59  120  0.125  0.149  0.488  0.483 
60  116  0.216  0.194  0.599  0.583 
61  84  0.190  0.233  0.675  0.680 
62  70  0.457  0.447  0.824  0.823 
63  51  0.412  0.503  0.896  0.912 
64  22  0.455  0.491  0.943  0.955 
65  14  0.857  0.468  0.992  0.976 
66  1  0.000  0.355  0.992  0.985 
aThe retirement rates were computed for the 1500 persons used to obtain 
the estimates reported in table 2.  The predicted retirement rates are 
based on model 5. 
—23a— Age 60  Age 62 
Actual  Predicted  Actual  Predicted 
1980  .599  .583  .824  .823 
1981  .674  .667  .868  .876 
Thus the model not only matches  closely the cumulative  departure  rates  in each 
year,  but also captures  the noticeable  increase  in  departure  rates  between 
1980 and 1981.  The actual  increaaes were  apparently  due to changes  in 
expected  future  earnings  or to  differences  in  the distribution  of  seniority  by 
age, both  of which  enter  the option  value caculations.13 
B.  Three Consecutive  Years 
1.  Parameter  Estimates 
Estimates  in  this section  are based on the same sample of  employees  used 
to obtain  the single-year  estimates  reported above,  but those who don't leave 
the firm  in  the first year  are followed  for two more  years.  Four outcomes  are 
possible:  a person  retires in the first,  the second,  or the third year,  or he 
does  not retire during  the three-year  period.  Estimated  parameters  of three 
versions  of the model  are shown  in  table 4.  The first  estimares  pertain  to 
the model  specification  as described  in section  IT-E-2, with p  1.  In  this 
case,  the only  difference  between  the multiple-  and single-year  versions  of 
the model  is that there are two error variances  in  the multiple-year  version: 
the variance  in  the first  of  the observation  years 
--  1980  in  this case, 
and r, the variance  of  the "innovation"  in the relationship  v5  V1  + 
13Real  earnings  of firm employees were in  fact declining  over this 
period. 
-  24  - Table 4 
Parameter Estimates Based on  Retirement Decisions in Three Consecutive Years 
1980-  1982 
-y  k  ko 
Parameters 
k1 




--  --  0.796 
(0.004) 
1a  0.117 
(0.003) 
0.092  1114.86 
(0.005) 










0.138  1100.49 
(0.008) 
3.  1.278 
(0.006) 










0.140  1099.75 
(0.007) 
aParameter value imposed. 
-24a- e.  The estimates  are close  to the single-year  estimates  (model  5 in  table 
2), although  the estimated  value  of p is somewhat  larger, and the value  of  fi 
somewhat smaller.  The base  error  variance  is essentially  the same as the 
single-equation  estimate.  The variance  of  the innovation  is only slightly 
smaller  (.1170 versus  .0919)  than the base  variance.  It means  that  the 
uncertainty  about  an  individual's  valuation  of the option  value  of continued 
work in future  years 
-  -  which  stems  from  uncertainty  about  future values  of  v 
-- ia much greater  than the uncertainty  about  the option  value  of continued 
work today.  This contributes  to greater uncertainty  about current  departure 
decisions  when  comparison  is made  with  more distant future  retirement  agea, 
that is, when departure  rates  of  younger  employees  are conaidered.  (See the 
diacuaaion  following  equation  (2.17).)  On the other  hand,  given °al' the 
uncertainty  about  v5 is less than  the uncertainty  about 051. 
A  measure  of  the persiatence  in  the individual  disturbance  is indicated 
by the correlation  between  the v's in  the first and second  periods  of the 
sample; with the random  walk specification;  it is given by 
rL/(r2Y(r2 +  This correlation  is .748 based  on  the model 1 
estimates  in table 4.  Less persistence  is allowed  by estimating  p.  Parameter 
estimates  based  on  this specification  are shown  in  model 2  in  table  4.  The 
estimated  value  of  p is  .786.  Judging by the likelihood  values  in models  I 
and 2,  the  statistic  relative  to the hypothesis  that  p  is 1 ia 28.74 with 
one degree of  freedom.  Thus the strict  random walk assumption  is clearly 
rejected.  On  the other hand,  the estimated  variancea  increase  so that the 
correlation  between  the first  and second  disturbance  terms  does  not change 
much.  In  this case,  it is given by pc3/(o)4(p2o3 + g)½  Its value, 
based  on the model  2 estimates  in table  4,  is  .708,  compared  with a 
correlation  of .786 based  on the strict random  walk  assumption.  Consistent 
-  25  - with this observation,  predicted  average  departure  rates  based  on the two 
models  are very similar. 
Unlike  other  empirical  retirement  models, age is not a variable  in  the 
option  value  model;  ft enters  only indirectly  through  the survival 
probabilities  ir(slt),  the wage earning  forecasts,  and the firm  pension  plan 
and Social  Security  rules.  A general  test of the extent  ro which  retirement 
behavior  is  determined  by the monetary  variables  in  the option  value  model 
is the gain in the model  fit when age itself  is added.  We implement  such a 
teat by parameterizing  k ma a function  of  age, allowing  the relative  value  of 
income  without work to income  with  work to depend  on  age,  independent  of the 
income  variables  in  the model.  In  addition,  this parameterization  is a way to 
recognize  that the alternative  to work at the firm  may be another job,  instead 
of  retirement,  and thus that the systematic  portion  of the model  may 
undervalue  the "retirement"  option  for some employees,  especially  at  younger 
ages.14 The model  3 estimates  in  table 4 are based  on the specification 
k 
k  k0(Age/55) 
1  The estimmtes  show virtually  no effect  of age.  For 
example,  at  age 65, k is 1.039  timea  ita value at 55, 1.678.  The others 
parameters  of  the model are essentially  unaffected.  The likelihood  value  is 
increased  very little and thus a likelihood  ratio test  does  not reject  the 
hypothesis  of no age effect  (y2(l) — 1.48). 
14As emphasized  above,  however,  the Markov  specification  implies  a 
heteroskedastic  disturbance  with larger variance  the greater  the difference 
between  the current  age and future  contemplated  retirement  ages.  Thus the 
varisnce  of  the individual  effects  is larger  for younger  employees.  One of 
the unobserved  determinants  of departure  that  the random  component  captures  is 
valuations  of  the  "retirement"  alternative  that  differ  from  the average.  It 
is this aspect of  the specification  that  allows  the model  to fit departure 
rates  at  younger  ages,  as shown  in  table  3  for the single-year  model. 
-  26  - 2.  The Model  Fit 
Like the single-year  model,  the fit of  the three-year  version  can be 
evaluated  by comparing  predicted  versus  actual  departure  rates.  The cesults 
are shown in  table  5.  It is analogous  to the comparison  presented  in  table  3, 
based  on the single-year  model.  The annual  retirement  rate in  table  5,  for 
persons  of a given  age, is the average of  the rates  over the three  estimation 
years.  The cumulative  figures are based  on these average  annual  rates.  Three 
aspects of the results  stand out:  First,  the modal fits the data  very  well. 
Second,  there is little  difference  between  the p a 1  and the p-estimated 
versions  of the model, although  the p-estimated  specification  fits  somewhat 
better  than  the p a 1 model at older ages and somewhat  less well  at the 
younger  ages.  Thus even  though  the likelihood  values  in  table 4 indicate  that 
the second  version  fits the data  better,  for practical  purposes,  the strict 
random  walk assumption  appears  to be as conaistent  with the data  as the more 
genersl  specification.15  Third,  the model  may underpredict  the retirement 
15The x2 statistic  is a more formal way to compare the model fits. 
statistics  have  been calculated  for each  of the three years, based on three 
methods  of  estimation:  (1) The three-yesr  model with p a 1,  model  1 in table 
4.  (2)  The three-year  model with p estimated,  model  2 in table 4.  (3) 
Independent  estimates  for each  of the three years, with p a 1.  For example, 
using  the sample of  persons  that  is still in  the firm  after  1980,  estimates 
are obtained  for 1981,  and similarly  for 1982.  The statistic  is a(Aa 
where  a indexes age, A  is the actual number  of  persons  that retired, 
and E is the expected  number, based  on the model  estimates.  The results  are 
as follows: 
111  LZ1  01 
1980  25.2  20.7  24.4 
1981  30.7  29.9  9.2 
1982  27.3  19.0  16.1 
The comparisons  reveal  two features  of  the results:  The p-estimated  fits 
—  27  — Table  5 
Predicted versus  Actual  Retirement  Rates by Age, Based  on the Three-Year 
Model,  1980_1982a 
Age 
Mumber  of 
Observations 
in  1980 
Annual  Retirement  Rates  Cumulative  Rates 
Actual  p  1 
Predicted 
p Estimated  Actual 
Predicted 









































































































































aThe retirement  rates by age are the average of the rates  over the three years 
used in  estimation.  The cumulative  rates are based  on these  averages. 
—27a— rates  of the few persons  that remain in  the firm  at older  ages.  In 
particular,  both  models  underpredict  retirement  rates  at 65.  Even  with p 
estimated,  the model  eatimates  imply substantial persistence  in individual 
valuations  of  the option  value  of  continued  work,  consistent  with the behavior 
of the vast  majority  of the sample.  For example,  if a person  chooses not to 
retire  at 62 when there was a reasonable  ex ante probability  that he would, 
the model uses this information  to  adjust downwsrd  the probability  that he 
will retire in the next  year.  The results  seem  to suggest  that  this  sssumed 
persistence  of tastes  may not carry  through age 65.  There may be an age-65 
"customary  retirement  age" effect.  The sample  size of older  persons  is so 
small, however--only  2.5 percent  of  the sample  is 64 or older--that 
verification  of this possibility  will  have to await  estimation  with  larger 
samples of older  employees;  the current evidence  can only  be taken  as 
suggestive 
16 
better  than the p  1 model.  And,  although  the indpendent  estimate  for i981 
fits better  than  the p-estimated  version of the three-year  model_for  that 
year,  it is not clear  that that would  be generally  true in repeated 
replications.  The independent  estimate is worse  for 1980 and only  slightly 
better  for 1982.  A  tentative  conclusion  is that the p-estimated  version  of 
the three-year  model  reproduces  the data  very accurately. 
16Another  variant  of predicted  versus  actual  departure  rates  shows  the 
probability  that a person  will rstire during  the thtee year  period  that he is. 
The conslusions  are similar  to those discussed  above.  In general, both 
specifications  fit the data  very  well.  For example,  of  persons  who were sga 
55 on January  1, 1981,  24.8 percent  left the firm  between  January  1,  1980 and 
December  31, 1982.  The predicted  retirement  rate based on the specification 
with p  1 is 23.5  percent;  it is 22.8 percent based on  the specification  with 
p estimated. 
-  28  - IV.  Illustrative  Simulations 
To  demonstrate  the importance  of  firm pension  plan  provisions  on 
departure  rates,  the effects  of  two alternatives  are simulated.  The first  is 
a simple  variant  of the existing  plan,  increasing  the early  retirement  age 
from 55 to 60.  The second  represents  a more fundamental  change,  replacing  the 
existing  defined  benefit plan  with a defined contribution  plan.  In both 
cases,  the effects  are quite dramatic.  The simulations  are based  on the 
single-year  estimates  (model 5 in  table  2, with p  1).  Additional 
simulations,  chat  compare  the effects  on  retirement  of  changes  in pension 
versus  Social  Security  provisions,  are reported  in Stock  and  Wise [1988]. 
A.  Increasing  the Early  Retirement  Age 
Although  retirement  rates beginning  at age 62 are very  high,  by that  age 
moat of those  employed at age 50 have already  left the firm.  It is evident 
that  this is due in  large part to the plan's  early retirement  provisions.  To 
quantify  the importance  of early  retirement,  we have simulated  retirement 
behavior  under  an alternative  provision.  Early  retirement  under  the 
alternative  is at 60 instead of 55.  Otherwise  the alternative  is like the 
existing  plan.  Persons who are employed  at 60 or older face the same  options 
under the alternative  as under  the existing  plan. 
The results  are reported  in table  6.  The base retirement  rates  are the 
single-year  model predictions  under  the existing  plan.  Under  the existing 
plan,  almost  half of  those  in  the firm  at age 50 have  left  before  age 60. 
Only 30 percent would  have left if  early  retirement  had been  at age 60 instead 
of  55, according  to the simulation  results.  With the existing  plan,  36.7 
percent of  those  employed  at 50 leave the firm  between  55 and 59.  With early 
-  29  - Table 6 
Simulation:  Early  retirement  age is 60 instead  of 55a 
Cumulative  Retirement  Rates  Retirement  Rates 
























































































































aBased  on  model  5 parameter  estimates,  reported  in  table  2.  The simulation  is 
described  in the text. 
bFor  persons  employed at age 60 and older,  the simulated  alternative  is the 
same as the base case. 
-29a- retirement  at 60, only 11.5 percent  would  leave at these ages.  Almost  no one 
leaves just before  age 60.  On the other hand,  departure  rates before  55, are 
larger  under the alternative,  with  a cumulative  rate at 54 of .185,  versus 
.116 under the existing  plan.  This  reflects  the longer  wait  before  the early 
retirement  bonus  can  be claimed.  Still,  the net reduction  in  departure  rates 
before  age 60 is very substantial. 
B.  A Defined  Contribution  versus  The Defined Benefit  Plan 
The incentive  effects  inherent in the firm's  age-compensation  profile  are 
largely  the result of  the provisions  of the pension  plan.  An alternative  td  a 
defined benefit  plan is a defined contribution  plan.  Under  a typical defined 
contribution  plan  an amount  equivalent  to a certain  percentage  of an 
employee's  annual wage earnings  is put in a pension  fund.  Once vested,  the 
amount  that  the employee  has in  the fund depends only  on the contributions  on 
his behalf  and on the return on  these  contributions.  Retirement  benefits  are 
then  based on  the employee's  accumulated assets  in  the fund  at the time that 
he retires. 
The effect  of a change from  the existing  defined benefit  to a defined 
contribution  plan is illustrated  under  two assumptions.  The first assumption 
is that the defined benefit  contribution  rate is such  that for a person  who 
has 30 years  of service at age 60, the fair annuity value  of  the amount  in the 
defined  contribution  fund  is the same as the present value  of the retirement 
benefits  that the person  would  receive  from the defined  benefit  plan  were he 
to retire  at 60.  This requires  that the contribution  to  the defined 
contribution  plan be equal  to 7.5 percent of earnings.  The second  assumption 
is thst  the contribution  is equal  to  5  instead of  7.5 percent of earnings. 
The results  are shown  in  table  7. 
-  30  - Table  7 
Simulation:  Defined  Contribution  versus  The Defined Benefit  Plan° 
Age 
Number  of 
Observations 
Annual  Retirement  Rate  Cumulative  Retirement 
Simulation 
Base  7.5  5.0  Base 
Simulation 































0081  0.065 
0.184  0.150 
0.269  0.221 
0.346  0.287 































0.489  0.413 
0.548  0.467 
0.614  0.529 
0.668  0.582 































0.776  0.693 
0.819  0.739 
0.888  0.824 
0.933  O.884 













0.982  0.960 
0.993  0.980 
aBased  on model  5 parameter  estimates,  reported  in table 2.  The simulation  is 
described  in  the text. 
-30a- Consider  first  the annual  departure  rates based on  the 7.5 percent 
contribution  level.  Again,  the comparison  is with the predicted  departure 
rates  based  on the model  5 single-year  estimates  shown  in table 2.  There  are 
two important  features  of the results:  First,  the discontinuities  in  the 
departure  rates at 55 and at 60 are eliminated.  Departure  rates  increase 
smoothly between  ages 50 and 61.  The jump at 62,  due to Social  Security 
provisions,  remains,  however.  The effect of the Social Security  provisions  at 
65 is now noticeable;  it  was not before.  Second,  although  retirement  rates 
after  age 60 are lower under  the defined contribution  plan,  departure  rates  at 
earlier  ages  are much  higher.  There is now no need to stay in  the firm  to 
receive  the  "retirement  bonus"  at  55, or to receive  full  benefits  at 60 with 
30  years  of service.  The net result  is that  more employees  have left the firm 
by age 60 under  the defined contribution  than  under  the defined  benefit  plan. 
These  results  are consistent  with the view that the defined  benefit  plan  keeps 
employees  in  the firm  until  certain ages  and then provides  an  incentive  to 
leave.  The defined contribution  plan  does not encourage  them  to  stay,  but if 
they  do, neither  does  it encourage  them  to leave.  Like  departures  under  the 
current  firm  plan,  it should be sssuined  that  a large  proportion  of  persons who 
leave  the firm  at the younger  ages under  the simulated  plan do so for another 
job, whereas at older  ages  most  ace leaving  the labor  force.  The results with 
the 5 percent  contribution  rate are similar  to those with the 7.5 percent 
level, except  that the departure  rates are lower. 
III.  Summary and Conclusiona 
We have presented  a model  of  retirement  based  on the option value of 
continued  work.  A person  continues  to work if the option  of selecting  a 
-  31  - better  age of retirement  in the future  is worth  more than  the value  of 
retiring  now.  The model is both forward looking at a point  in time and allows 
expectations  about  future eventa  to be updated  ma individuals  age.  It thus 
incorporated  the advantages  of  non-linear  budget  constraint  formulations  of 
the retirement  decision  and the advantages  of continuous  time hazard  model 
formulations.  The Markovian  specification  of the individual  random  effects, 
or the random walk special  case of it,  is an important  component  of the model. 
Single- and multiple-year  versions  of the model yield  very similar  results. 
Predicted  departure  rates based  on the model match actual  departure  rates 
very closely.  In  particular,  discontinuous  jumps  in retirement  rates  at 
specific  ages are captured  by the model predictions.  Out of sample 
predictions  lend support  to the predictive  validity  of the model. 
Simulations  of  the effects  of  alternative pension  plans show  that plan 
provisions  have  very dramatic  effects  on retirement  rates.  For example, 
increasing  the early  retirement  age from 55 to 60 would  reduce  by almost  40 
percent  the proportion  of those employed  at age 50 that  has  left the firm 
before  age 60.  At the same time,  it would  increase  departure  rates between  50 
and 55, reflecting  the longer wait until the early retirement  "bonus" can be 
claimed. 
Switching  from  the defined benefit  to a defined contribution  plan  would 
have even  greater effects  on firm departure  rates.  The defined  contribution 
formulation  has no incentive  effects.  Annual  departure  rates  of  persons  60 
and over  would  be reduced  substantially.  But, the departure  rates between  50 
and 54 would  be increased  from around 3 to  about  10 percent,  close  to the 
departure  rate between  55 and 59, after the early retirement  age, under  the 
existing  plan.  It is also close  to the departure  rate of  employees  who are 
under  50 and have just  become  vested  in  the existing  firm  plan.  The net 
-  32  - effect  is to increase  significantly  the proportion  of those  employed  st  age 50 
who have left the firm  before  age 60.  These results  support  the view that 
defined  benefit plans  provide  a strong  and effective  incentive  for employees 
to stay  in  the fira  until  some age and then a strong  and effective  incentive 
to retire  at some later  age.  The defined  contribution  plan does neither. 
Although  these  results  are based  on  the retirement  decisions  of employees 
in only  one large  firm,  it is important to understand  that the incentive 
effects  inherent  in this firm's  pension plan  are very typical  of defined 
benefit plans.  Nonetheless,  we will in  future work determine  whether  the 
results are supported  in similar analysis based  on data from  other  firms. 
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-  37  - Appendix  A:  A  Hazard  Model  Interpretation 
The general  option value  model is computationally  complex.  It is 
therefore  of both  methodological  and substantive  interest  to demonstrate  the 
relationship  between  the option  value  model  and the mote familiar  proportional 
hazard  model,  which  is sttaightforward  to eatimate  and is widely  used in  the 
empirical  analysis  of retirement  and labor force  participation.  Thia appendix 
demonstrates  that  the option  value model teduces to the conventional 
proportional  hazard  model  when the stochastic  term  in (2.13) ia degenerate 
with a unit exponential  distribution,  that is, when  corresponds  to a aing].e 
random  effect with a unit exponential  distribution,  and  when the "systematic" 
component  of G(r), g(r)/IC(r), 
is non-increasing.  These are strong 
restrictions  on  the general option  value model.  The non-increasing 
requirement  is clearly inconsistent  with our data, and the degenerate 
distributional  assumption  would  severely  limit  the flexibility  rhat the 
Markovisn  specification  provides  in fitting observed  retirement  behavior.  In 
demonstrating  the relationship  between  the two models,  the appendix  also draws 
attention  to the natural  utility  interpretetion  of  the proportional  hazard 
model. 
Using the notation  in the text, consider  the probability  that a person 
retires before  age r, according  to the proportional  hazard  specification,  csll 
it H(r).  It is typically described  in  continuous  time and is given  by 
(Al)  H(s)  Pr[Rr] 
= 1  - exp[-fTtO(u)duj 
Pr[e ￿  f=t6(u)du] 
- A-l  - where 9  is required  to be non-negative  and e is a random variable  with  a unit 
exponential  distribution.  Contemplating  the development  below,  suppose  that 
S=t9(u)du  is the utility  gain from retirement  at age r.  The hazard  rate is 
H'  (r)/{l 
- H(r)j  = [1 
- H(r)]9(r)/(l 
-  1-1(r)]  —  9(r),  which  is the derivative 
of the utility  of retirement  at time r. 
We adopt  the convention  that  H(r) corresponds  to the continuous  time 
probability  in (Al), and Hr corresponds  to its discrete  time counterpart  when 
r  is an integer.  With this notetion,  for integer  r (Al) can be written  as 
(Al)  H  1  -  exp(XTt+l9*) 
— Pr[e ￿  r+19*] 
,  where  9>I=5i9(u)du 
Notice  that Pr[R>r]  is the probability  that at every  age before  r the person 
r  *  .  .  did not retire.  If  + e is the utility  gain from retirement, 
versus  continued  work,  at age r,  then  the hazard  model  haa a standard  utility 
interpretation.  This interpretation  will  always be true for some 
specification  of the utility  of  retirement  versus  continued  work.  Suppose 
that  is monotonically  increasing  with  r.  Then retirement  will 
occur when the value of this  expression  exceeds e.  The random  term  e in the 
proportional  hazard  model  is an individual-specific  term  thst remains constant 
over time;  it can  he thought  of  as an individual-specific  threshold.  The 
person  retires  when  crosses the threshold.  The utility  gain  from 
retirement  must  be monotonically  increasing; it will  be if 9  is non- 
negstive  for all a.  We want to show  that under  strong  restrictions  the option 
value  model  reduces  to this form. 
-  A-2  - The option  value  specification  of the gain froa  retirement  et age t Ia 
EV(t) 
- EtVt(r*).  As long as g(r)/K(r) > -  the  person  does not 
retire.  Recall frn (2.16) that in  the option  value (0) model of  retirement, 
the probability  of retiring  by r (let this  be  is 
(A.3)  0  — Pr[R￿rJ  = 1  -  Pr[R>r} 
1 - Prtg(r)/K(r) 
> -v  g(r)/K(r) 
> -vJ. 
Pr[R>r]  is the probability  that at gg.g  age from  t -  -  the age that th  petaon 
is first observed  -- until age  r  it is better  to postpone  retitement.  That La 
the value,  or  utility,  of postponing  tetirement  is in each  year greater  than 
the value  of retirement.  Equation  (A.3) is the probability  of the complement 
of that  event.  The proportional  hazard  specification  is obtained  as a speciaL 
case of  the option  value  model by placing restrictions  on both the error 
and on g5(r)/R5(r). 
In  particular,  assume  that:  (i) yr  a for all 
(so that  the only  stochastic  element  in the retirement  decision  enters  through 
a single  time-invariant  random  effect), where  e has a unit exponential 
distribution,  and  (ii)  g5(r)/K5(r)  (the scaled  value of postponing 
retirement)  is  non-increasing.  Under assumption  (i)  the expreasion  (A.3) 
reduces  to 
(A.4)  Or 
= 1  - Pr[g(4)/K(r) > -e  g(r)/K(rj) 
> -a] 
= 1  - Pr[min(g(r)/K(r)  g(r)/K(r!)) 
> -a 
That is,  the event R ￿  r otcura  only if the minimum  gain  from  continued  work 
was not always  greater  than  zero,  if the minimum  value  of g(r)/K(r) 
waa not always  greater  than  the threshold  -a. 
- A-3  - If 
g5(r)/1K5(r) is non-increasing,  then  its smallest  value  will  be 
in period  r.  With both  assumptions  (i) and (ii), (A.4) becomes: 
(A.5)  O 
= I  -  Pr[g(r)/K7(r)  > -e] 
1 - exp[g(r)/K(r)] 




Note  that the assumption  that g5(r)/k5(r)  is non-increasing  implies that 
is non-negative.  Given  thia,  the condition  for the second  expression  in 
(AS)  to be between  0 and 1 is that g(r)/K(r) ￿  0.  This  initial term 
is computed  by the option  value  model.  In  the hazard  model,  however,  this 
would  correspond  to an intercept  that  can always  be chosen  so that this 
condition  is satisfied. 
Numerical  values  for the terms  in (AS) would  come from evaluating  the 
expressions  like those  for V in  the text, but in  the option  value  model  the V 
terma would  clearly  not be  non-negative.  In  the proportional  hazard  model 
would typically  be expressed  as 
f(t).exp(Xfl).h(Zm),  where  f(t)  is a function 
of  age, X is a vector  of  variables  that remain  constant  over  time,  and  are 
variables  that change  over  time.  The latter variables  could  in  principle 
include a variable  like our Gt(r*),  but without estimating  its parameters. 
The parameters  would  be assumed  and estimation  of the hazard  model  would  yield 
an estimated  coefficient  on  the computed  Gt(r*)  values. 
Comparison  of (A.2)  and (AS)  shows  that the option  value  model  reduces 
to the proportional  hazard  model  if the error  is ssaumed  to be degenerate 
-  A-4  - over time with a unit exponential  distribution,  if g5(r)/k5(r) 
is non- 
increasing,  artd if g(r)/K(r)  is set to zero.  In this case,  the unit 
average hazard  rate, 9,  is the negative  of the change  in  the nonstochastic 
component  of the utility,  &.  Equivalently,  the hazard  model  can  he thought 
of as being derived  from an  underlying  optimization  problem  where the unit 
averaged  hazard  rate is equal  to  the change,  during  that intetval,  in  the 
value  of being  retired. 
The assumption  that  g5(r)/K5(r)  be non-increasing  is used to obtain 
the closed  form (AS).  This could  be  relaxed,  however,  by using (A.4) to 
calculate  the probabilities,  although  this would  yield a non-standard  hazard 
model.  Similarly,  the assumption  of  the unit exponential  distribution  could 
be replaced  by (say)  the assumption  of normality,  in which  case  (A.4) implies 
that O. = (-min[g0(r)/K(r)  g(rj)/K7(r)1),  where  '(.)  denotes 
the standard  normal  distribution. 
The similarity  between  (A.2) and (AS) has two implications.  On the one 
hand,  it suggests  chat an  appropriate  formulation  of the proportional  hazard 
model  might  be used to  describe  retirement  behavior,  avoiding  the multiple 
integrals  inherent  in (2.15) and (2.16).  On the other hand,  the derivation 
makes clear how restrictive  the assumptions underlying  the proportional  hazard 
specification  are.  The derivation  also provides  a link  between  the utility 
maximization  problem  discussed  in section II and the conventional  proportional 
hazard  model, which is typically  presented  in an ad-hoc  manner  with little 
economic  motivation.  While  this  derivation  suggests  covariates  for its 
estimation  (namely those entering  g(r)),  it also makes its weaknesses  more 
apparent. 
-  A-S  - Appendix  B:  Wage  Forecasting  Equation 
The estimation  procedure  uses earnings  forecasts  to compute  the expected 
value of the utility  of future  income, both  when employed  and after 
retirement.  Pension benefits  depend  on  the entire  earnings history  of the 
individual  at the firm  up to the date of  retirement.  Thus pension benefits 
for future  dates of retirement  are in genecal based  on  both earnings  history, 
known  to the individual  at the current date, and forecasts  of  future  earnings. 
For example,  in  1981, estimates  of the pension benefits  that  would  be received 
were retirement  in  1986 involve known  earnings  through 1981 and forecasts  for 
the remaining  years. 
The income  forecasting  equation,  shown  in  table 8-1, was estimated  using 
98,465  observations,  including  multiple  observations  for the same person, 
taken  from a panel  of individuals  in the same job category  in the same  firm as 
the 1500 individuals  that  were  used in  the estimation  results reported  in  the 
text.  The earnings  data covet  1969-1984.  Nominal  earnings  were  converted  to 
1980 dollars using  the consumer price index.  St and  At respectively  denote 
years of  service  at the firm  and age; 072, 073,  etc. are dummy variables  for 
the indicated  years.  Income  forecasts  were  computed  using  the average  of  the 
coefficients  on the dummy variables  for 1978-1980,  where the 1980  coefficient 
is normalized  to be zero. 
The data  set contains  earnings  from  1969 on.  Thus  earnings  before  1969 
(for those who joined  the firm  before  1969) were  back-cast  using a 
specification  similar  to the forecasting  equation  in  table  8-1.  The estimates 
(not reported  here)  were obtained  using  the same  specification,  except  that 
time  was reversed  in  the sense  that all lags  were replaced by leads. 
-  B-i  - Table  B-i 
Estimated  income  forecasting  equation 
Dependent  variable:  lnY 
Regressor  Coefficient  Standard  Error  t-statistic 
At 
-0.00107124  0.001002558  -1.069 
St 
0.002456179  0.0009254529  2.654 
A  -0.0001088365  0.00001254898  0.867 
S 
0.0001038392  0.00001554057  6.682 
AtSt  -0.000129604  0.00002289325  -5.661 
LnYi  -0.269047  0.0173911  -15.470 
AlnYti 
0.0001924038  0.0004487285  0.429 
SlnYti  0.002951872  0.0005582732  5.288 
lnYt2  -0.29905  0.01681537  -17.784 
AlnY2  0.003397685  0.0004338587  7.831 
S1nY2 
0.001986168  0.0005479163  3.625 
intercept  -0.0759745  0.01984605  -3.828 
D72  0.16442198  0.003250329  50.586 
D73  0.13501186  0.003229089  41.811 
D74  0.12498651  0.003179938  39.305 
D75  0.07275624  0.003142718  23.151 
D76  0.13272861  0.003113418  42.631 
D77  0.13154143  0.003111171  42.280 
D78  0.16778513  0.003076656  54.535 
D79  0.07741906  0.003073479  25.189 
D8l  0.06855253  0.003210239  21.354 
D82  0.03074399  0.003277569  9.380 
083  0.05627368  0.003304291  17.030 
D84  0.07609989  0.003388655  22.457 
SEE — 0.198 
- B-2  - 